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Abstract 
In his essay, "Althusser's Mirror," Carsten Strathausen reveals the paternal politics inherent to any gesture 
of appropriation. Molding Lacan to an Althusserian mirror, Strathausen demonstrates parallels between 
Lacan's mirror stage and Althusser's interpellated subject. The resemblance, created through what 
Strathausen suggests is Althusser's mis-reading of Lacan, reveals their mutual influence. The question of 
influence, however, becomes an issue of tradition Althusser links to a politics of legitimacy and right he 
associates with a figure of paternity. While the process of filiation would seem to extend from Lacan to 
Althusser in the logic of the mirror employed by Strathausen to renew Marxist thought, Althusser also 
situates himself as the father to a Lacan he is attempting to salvage from the ignominy of illegitimacy. 
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"Marx based his theory on a rejection of homo oeconomicus," 
wrote Louis Althusser, "Freud based his on a rejection of homo 
psychologicus." Lacan has seen and understood Freud's liberating 
rupture. He has comprehended it in the full sense of the word, taking it 
in its full rigor and constraining it to generate-without reservation- 
its own consequences. Like anyone, he may err in details, or even in his 
choice of philosophical bearings. What we owe him is the "essential" 
("Freud and Lacan" 181). The "essential" is the understanding of 
rupture that places Freud in a triumvirate with Marx and Nietzsche, the 
other two "Natural" children of the end of the nineteenth century. 
Sharing a philosophical fatherlessness, these bastards represent not only 
a break in philosophical tradition, but also a break in the very idea of 
tradition, legacy, and the continuation of the name of the father. 
Beginning his 1964 essay "Freud and Lacan" with an extended 
metaphor of paternity, Althusser casts the "history of Western Reason" 
as a family affair: 
When a young science is born, the family circle is always ready for 
astonishment, jubilation, and baptism. Fora long time, every child, 
even the foundling, has been the reputed son of a father, and when 
it is a prodigy, the fathers would fight at the gate if it were not for 
the mother and the respect due her. (181) 
That Althusser should celebrate the eruption of genius, defined as the 
founders ofthe critical ruptures by which the science of modern criticism 
is born, in the terms of a conservative patriarchal tradition is not too 
suspect, except insofar as one might wish to critique the identification 
between philosophy and patriarchy. Althusser's five paragraphs about 
the absence of paternity and legitimacy, however, point, in an over- 
compensatory manner, to the nature of the legitimizing gesture Althusser 
is about to make in regard to Lacan, one he began to make in 1963. But 
the problem of father and son neither begins nor ends with Althusser in 
this family circle. Rather, we owe it to Carsten Strathausenfor revealing 
the paternal politics inherent to any gesture of appropriation. 
Althusser's notion of the interpellated subject owes much to his 
misreading of Lacan, argues Strathausen in his essay, "Althusser's 1
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Mirror." Outlining the parallels between Althusser's notion of the 
interpellated subject and Lacan' s analogy of the mirror stage, Strathausen 
demonstrates both Althusser's debt to Lacan and "the positive potential 
of any appropriation of Lacanian psychoanalysis for the understanding 
of ideology" (61). Using his own analogy of the mirror, Strathausen 
argues that Althusser's concept of interpellation "rests on the idea of the 
`mirror-stage' as the founding moment of the imaginary" (66). The 
temporal paradox inherent in Lacan's mirror stage-the idea that only 
after an infant gains a certain (anticipated) mastery can it understand the 
chaos from which it came-situates the mirror stage as the moment 
from which origins can be perceived as origins and can be enjoyed no 
longer. As a response to the question of when an individual is interpellated 
as a subject in ideology the mirror stage is clearly inadequate, but its 
model of interpellation, resting as it does on a gestalt, suggests a 
beginning point for the intersection of the nascent subject and the 
outside world. 
The mirror stage is the figuration of a process by which the subject 
comes to be constituted in history and ideology, but the mirror stage is 
not quite emblematic of the kind of mirroring logic Strathausen 
proposes between Althusser and Lacan. In a temporal ellipse and 
material eclipse, Strathausen tries to load Althusser's interpellated 
subject into the mirror stage as a figure by which subjectivity, is 
completely constituted. And to maintain his mirror, more parallelism 
than might actually exist is necessary. Paradoxically, Strathausen's 
forced parallel between the mirror stage and the interpellated subject 
forecloses the intricate dynamics of Lacan's quadrated subject, the very 
dynamics that might in fact provide some understanding of the relation 
between psychoanalytic and material conceptions of the subject. The 
mirror stage is only a point of departure (and not even really a point) to 
which the developing subject comes and from which the split subject 
continues to develop in its relation to the Other, to the others of culture, 
ideology, law, and to itself, existing simultaneously in the Imaginary, 
the Symbolic and the Real. This is very different, even in its vastly 
paraphrased form, from Althusser's claim of only a portion of Lacan, 
and curiously, in Strathausen's analysis, only the extra-linguistic 
portion. 
The most glaring disparity between Althusser and Lacan in 
Strathausen's presentation is evident in Strathausen's attempt to paral- 
lel their accounts of the subject, which he consistently envisions within 
the frame of an historical dialectic. Rereading Lacan's notions of the 
"Je" (Es) and Moi (ego) as stages in a process of splitting, Strathausen 
misses the one thing that radically separates Lacan from Althusser: the 2




notion of the unconscious. Though as Strathausen warns, "it is . . . 
crucial to distinguish between the 'I' (Je) and the 'ego' (moi)," he 
conceives of the former as "the split subject of the signifier" and the 
latter as "the imaginary self-identity of the subject" (68). In Lacan's 
subject, the Je and Moi exist as parts of a dynamic that exists in relation 
to the Other and to the others of culture, ideology, and law. The "le" 
is the speaking subject, split indeed, but rarely aware of it, split in fact 
by the co-presence of the "Moi," "the unconscious subject of identifi- 
cations and narcissism" (Ragland-Sullivan 42). Apart from omitting 
entirely the Other (other) parts of the quadrature, Strathausen's account 
also implies an order, first Je then Moi, which makes too literal Freud's 
statement "Wo Es war, soll Ich werden" and which situates half of a 
split subject as a temporal structure rather than a structural dynamic. 
Strathausen parses the subject in this way in order to make a 
comparison between Lacan's split subject and Althusser's idea of 
interpellation as a "hailing," a turning around. If the subject is always 
"turning around" within itself, as a function of its own first-Je-then- 
Moi splitting, then the psychoanalytic subject is already analogous to the 
interpellated subject: "inside" mirrors "outside," psychoanalysis and 
ideological critique cooperate, being like to like. While contriving 
parallels entails considerable stretching, here on the part of Strathausen, 
Strathausen himself simply mirrors some of the stretching gestures of 
Althusser in his assessment of Lacan's contribution to critical science. 
If Strathausen molds Lacan to an Althusserian mirror, Althusser molds 
Lacan to the mirror of a curiously detached Symbolic with which 
Althusser is preoccupied and which is central to his own analysis of the 
interpellated subject. 
In "Freud and Lacan," Althusser avows that "the most original 
aspect of Lacan's work" is "that this transition from (ultimately purely) 
biological existence to human existence (the human child) is achieved 
within the Law of Order, the law I shall call the Law of Culture, and that 
this Law of Order is confounded in its formal essence with the order of 
language" (193). In this passage Althusser recognizes the crucial 
function of language (though not its structural contribution) as well as 
the absolute link among the subject, language, and the Law of Culture. 
Althusser identifies the Law of Culture with the Symbolic Order which 
he sees (finally) as "the emblem of the Father, the emblem of right, of 
the Law, the fantasy image of all Right" (196-97). For Althusser, the 
concept of the Symbolic as Law is necessary as the locus of ideology- 
as "the repressive apparatus" that reproduces the "conditions of 
production" ("Ideology" 131). And he conflates this ideology identi- 3
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fled with the Symbolic with the unconscious precisely through the aegis 
of the family reproductive scenario ("Ideology" 165). 
The identification of the symbolic order with the Father and the 
Father with Law and right again points to Althusser's paternal subtext, 
the text with which he begins and ends. Althusser employs a version of 
the family scenario as a way to illustrate how it is that "individuals are 
always-already subjects" (73). Through the operation of family ideol- 
ogy and the predestiny of the "father's name," "the child is therefore 
always-already subject, appointed as a subject in and by the specific 
familial configuration which it is 'expected' once it has been con- 
ceived" (165). Thus, through a paternity that equals the Symbolic, the 
individual is the already-interpellated subject whose unconscious and 
ideological frame are the same. This certainly makes a lot of paternity 
as Althusser locates it as the prime signifier of the Symbolic. 
Why is Althusser preoccupied with the Symbolic in his essay on 
Freud and Lacan, especially when one of Lacan's most insistent 
concepts is the co-existence of the Symbolic, the Imaginary, and the Real 
orders? One clue lies in Althusser's link between the Symbolic and the 
term "Right" connected to the father's right to the mother and by 
extension to the order of legitimate offspring (197). Devoting the vast 
majority of the portion of the essay on Lacan to a discussion of the 
Symbolic as it relates to Right: to the Right of the father, to the Right of 
culture, to the Right of psychoanalysis to claim itself a science, 
Althusser's repetition reveals the fixation that structures his approach 
to Lacan. By creating a new "family" of critical science and by 
legitimizing therein its critical sons (such as Lacan) then his own project 
is also legitimate, as another son of the new order. But while the process 
of filiation would seem to extend from Lacan to Althusser in the logic 
of the mirror employed by Strathausen to renew Marxist thought, 
Althusser also situates himself as the father to a Lacan he is attempting 
to salvage from the ignominy of illegitimacy. 
Althusser had first encountered psychoanalysis in his own treat- 
ments for manic depression, but his interest in Lacan came as he 
"situated Freud's discovery at the heart of the historic continent opened 
up by Marx" in his attempt to revivify French communist thought 
(Roudinesco 377). In 1963 he began to teach Lacan's works in his own 
seminar at the Ecole Normale Supdrieure. Students read the works from 
a more philosophical and less clinical perspective, according to Eliza- 
beth Roudinesco, and began to understand Lacan's structuralist read- 
ings of Freud as scientific rather than as "bourgeois," the epithet 
Marxists had previously extended to Freud. Lacan, who had been 
banished from the International Psychoanalytical Association in 1963, 4




began his own fledgling school, the Ecole Freudienne de Paris in 1964, 
the same year Althusser published "Freud and Lacan." By means of his 
acknowledgement of the importance of Lacan's work, Althusser had 
orchestrated a wider audience for a more "universalist" reading of 
Freudian theory. As Roudinesco observes, "for the 'symbolic' launch- 
ing of that mobilization which would occupy a far larger stage than the 
ENS, Lacan owed everything to Althusser" (380). 
Althusser also owed much to Lacan, whose analytical insights 
enabled Althusser to renew French Marxist thought and make Althusser 
famous within "a broad intellectual audience" (Roudinesco 381). 
While in a sense the history of the early 1960s casts Althusser as a father 
to Lacan, it is only as a son to Lacan that Althusser can forge new 
theoretical directions. His insistence in "Freud and Lacan," then, on 
Lacan's understanding of the role of the Symbolic and the right of the 
father has everything to do in context with the scientific "right" of 
psychoanalysis and its applicability to Marxist critique, the right of the 
father Althusser to appropriate psychoanalytic thought for Marxism, 
and ultimately the "right" of both Freud and Marx to father critical 
movements that engender a different sense of history. Althusser's 
recognition of Lacan retrospectively legitimates the bastards of the 
nineteenth century, making them the new fathers of a dissidence that 
becomes all too legitimate in its longevity in a kind of post-natal 
institutionalization. 
This process of legitimation via the paternal, however, owes its 
"right" to the originary fathers' illegitimacy--their lack of paternity. 
Their genius is proved by their rupture, by their inability to find language 
or concepts in which they might express their own new visions of history, 
the subject, and the order of human events. If their legitimacy-their 
"right" to scientific prestige-comes from their lack of forbears, why 
does Althusser reinscribe them within a family circle he has already 
declared ideologically suspect? Is he simply another victim of ideology 
unable to speak the scientific language he claims for the fathers as a 
result of the very fact of his adopting them as his fathers (or sons)? 
Althusser's insistent discussion of paternity and legitimacy at the 
beginning of "Freud and Lacan" would seem to have everything to do 
with his own legitimacy and the legitimacy of historical materialism in 
a metaphor that defies the very notion of scientific discourse Althusser 
insists upon. Premising the "right" of a discourse to the status of a 
science on the model of the law-of-the-name-of-the-father and hailing 
that science as a rupturing critique of the very law by which it is 
legitimized exposes the contradiction at the heart of patriarchy: that the 
law-of-the-name-of-the-father covers over the absence of certainty by 5
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substituting the Symbolic for the scientific, by asserting a "right" where 
one may not exist. For Althusser, the name of the father by which right 
is authorized can never be the name of a father, but only the name of a 
son who becomes the father to the fathers, who rescues them from the 
illegitimacy their rupturing genius creates. Though the fathers of the 
new sciences have no fathers, they have sons, who, in the name of the 
father become self-fathering and self-authorizing, creating among 
themselves a mutual fathering that in the names of their fathers 
legitimates one another in a kind of critical cross-breeding. Curiously, 
however, in all of the fathering and "son"-ing, Althusser casts Lacan 
as neither father nor son, but rather as a midwife, the one who 
"constrains" Freud's "liberating rupture" to "generate . . . its own 
consequences. " Lacan's midwifery-his obstetrics-sideline him only 
in locus parentis, while Althusser becomes the fathering son. Sibling 
rivalry? 
The foundling Freud, the orphaned Marx are mirrored by their 
faithful bastard sons, the dissidents who walk in their fathers' dissi- 
dence, but who finally go one step farther by legitimating through one 
another the very projects by which their own fathers became bastards. 
This relegitimation, this re-inscription of the paternal line in the guise 
of a dissident critique reveals not only the most insidious conservatism, 
but also the way in which the sons create a new Symbolic in the place 
of the "scientific" language critical science can speak. Even thinking 
they might have exposed the folly of the name of the father, they return 
to it most seriously, insisting on scientific critique which has become 
covertly a truly paternal game enclosed in the trappings of issues of 
legitimacy, orthodoxy, and right that have in fact enveloped the legacies 
Althusser and Lacan. By making themselves fathers, fathers to their 
fathers, and fathers to one another, they have tightened the circulation 
of right to a father/son transaction, a reciprocal trade agreement by 
which history, culture, law, and the Symbolic may be transferred. Who 
better to understand the father than the son? And in a culture where the 
bastard sons have all become fathers, only one thing is true: Father 
knows best. 
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